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THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA:
NORAD AND NORTHCOM
Jack Davidt
U.S. Speaker
Professor King, thank you very much for inviting me to speak about
North American defense. As some of you know, I am principally from
Northwest Connecticut these days, secondarily from New York City. When I
was invited here to speak, I promptly did a bit of research about the name of
this institution, Case Western Reserve. I learned about the 1967 merger of
Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve University. It was the
Western Reserve part that intrigued me. What I learned was very interesting.
The term Western Reserve was used to describe the portion of the Ohio
territory in its northeast comer that Congress in 1786 gave to the State of
Connecticut in return for Connecticut ceding to the United States claims it
had to the rest of Ohio territory.' Connecticut, in 1795, sold the Western
Reserve to the Connecticut Land Company and used the money for public
education in Connecticut. The Land Company hired a man named Cleveland
to divide Connecticut's former reserve into towns. So in a remote historical
sense, my home state, Connecticut, is connected to this University. While
Case Western Reserve University does not look or feel like Connecticut, I
have certainly been made to feel very welcome and comfortable since my
arrival on Thursday. For this hospitality, I am very thankful to my host, Dr.
King, and to the Board of Canada-United States Law Institute here at Case
Western Reserve Law School.
Jack David is the United States Chairman of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense,
Canada-U.S. Prior to his appointment he ran a highly successful litigation and regulatory
practice in New York City, where he served as chairman of the board for the Association of
the Bar for the city of New York. Mr. David career also includes a number of key activities in
the area of human rights. He has served as a delegate to a working group of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, was the director for the International League of Human Rights, and is a
co-founder of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. He holds a bachelor's degree from
Rutgers University and a law degree from Columbia University.
1 On Sept. 13, 1786, by Deed of Cession, Connecticut relinquished all land east of the
Cuyahoga River except for the Western Reserve. This section of land started at the
Pennsylvania-Ohio line and extended 120 miles westward to the present Seneca and Sandusky
County lines. It was bordered on the north by Lake Erie and on the south by the parallel of the
41st degree North Latitude. History of Ohio's 88 County Names, OHIO CLERK OF COURTS
Assoc., availableat www.occaohio.com/Summerconfer/88map.htm
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I am very pleased to be with you today to share with you my thoughts on
the very important subject of the defense of North America. At the outset, I
must emphasize that what is said today are my personal thoughts. The views
I express will not be and should not be taken as the views of the United
States. The Board of which I am United States Chairman, the Permanent
Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, is an advisory board. It has
no executive authority or function. It does not make policy. The views I
express will be my own, and nothing but my own. For the members of the
media who are here, please note that any remarks attributed to me should be
accompanied by this disclaimer.
HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSE
North America was not always as safe and secure an environment as it
has been in our lifetimes. It was a battleground for most of the 181h Century.
Settlers of what are now Canada and the United States and their descendents
faced dangers from conflict with Indian tribes, as well as from violence
incident to the operations of British and French forces that were extensions
of ongoing conflict in Europe. It was only after 1763, when the British
succeeded in driving the French out of their colonial possessions in North
America, that North American residents became secure from having their
homeland be a battleground on which European conflict was fought. This
security was short lived.
The American colonies fought Britain for independence, the new United
States fought Britain again in the War of 1812, and the U.S. fought a bloody
Civil War with itself in the first half of the 1860's. Since the 1860's,
however, we have been fortunate that our homeland was not again a
battleground for the rest of the 19 th Century and all of the 2 0 th Century. After
1865, the years after the conclusion of the Civil War, and Canada's
confederation in 1867, Canada and the United States became closer and
closer as a result of trade, communication, and common interests and
concerns. But defense of the continent they share was not a principal
concern either of Canada or the United States until well after the end of the
First World War. Both countries in those years felt well protected by the vast
oceans that separated them from the bloody battleground of Europe. And the
First World War did not involve a threat to their territory, although
Canadians lived with the daily battlefield losses suffered by their heroic
soldiers in that war.
Development of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation
The perception that North America was secure because of the oceans
changed in the late 1930's, even while the people of both countries
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overwhelmingly denied that Nazi Germany was a threat to them. Some U.S.
and Canadian leaders new better. History shows that President Franklin
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King recognized early on that
Hitler threatened the Americas. After FDR, in 1936, lent his personal
prestige to a pact between the United States and Latin American countries to
convert the unilateral Monroe Doctrine to a multinational pact to protect the
Americas from the looming threats from Europe and the Far East, he issued a
declaration of solidarity with Canada. That was in August, 1938.
By September 1939, Great Britain and Canada were at war with
Germany. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), CanadalUnited
States, was created in 1940.2 The PJBD, the Board that I serve as United
States Chairman, together with the Canadian Chairman who is a
distinguished member of Parliament, was created because Roosevelt and
Mackenzie King concluded that the vast oceans on which reliance for
defense had for so long been justified, might no longer be sufficient to
protect the homeland, given Hitler's ambition and Germany's growing ability
to project power.
They saw an imminent threat to the safety of Canadians and Americans.
They anticipated a day in the near future when safety could not be assured by
the domestic law enforcement, immigration and other civilian authorities of
the two countries alone; a day when the military forces of both countries
might have to engage enemies within their homeland. When the PJBD was
created in August of 1940, the battle of Britain was raging. A favorable
outcome was less than a 50/50 prospect. Prime Minister King, who already
was then at war, and President Roosevelt, who was covertly supporting Great
Britain and Canada in the war against Nazi Germany, knew from secret
intelligence that the Nazi Germany intended to invade Britain in
mid-September. They thought there was a very good chance that a Nazi
invasion of North America would follow within the year.
Ogdensburg Declaration
They met in Ogdensburg, New York, and "discussed the mutual
problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United
States." The memorandum from which I just quoted and they issued after a
long night of discussion created the PJBD.3 The memorandum charged the
PJBD, whose members were to consist mostly of members of the military of
the two countries, with studying, "sea, land and air problems including
2

Ogdensburg

Declaration,

C.T.S.

1940/14,

Aug.

18,

1940.

available

at

www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/keydocs/keydocs -detailsen.asp?intDocumentld= 19
3 Hemispheric Defense, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, Aug. 24, 1940, available at
www.ola.bc.ca/online/cf/documents/19400gdensburgAgreement.html
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personnel and material," and considering, "in the broad sense, the defense of
the north half of the western hemisphere." The objective was to give the
President and the Prime Minister advice about how to coordinate defense
policy and planning between the two nations.
The very first task undertaken by the PJBD was to identify the places on
the northeast coast of North America that Nazi Germany would likely use as
a stepping stone to a land invasion and devise plans for U.S. and Canadian
forces to prevent any such effort and to defeat it if it occurred. The United
States had 15 million men and women in uniform at the height of World War
II; Canada had more than a million. At the height of the war, the United
States was devoting roughly half of its gross national product to the war
effort. We fought and gave our lives and our treasure to preserve the way we
in North America live, to liberate those who had been conquered by the SS,
and to prevent our homeland from becoming a battleground. As President
Roosevelt said in a radio address the evening of D-day, "For these men are
lately drawn from the ways of peace. They fight not for the lust of conquest.
They fight to liberate. They fight to let justice arise and tolerance and good
will among all thy people. ' 4
Although, the allies succeeded in World War II, the possibility that the
United States and Canadian territory might once more become a battleground
did not end. The Soviet Union quickly emerged as a clear major threat. Its
conduct in Europe after the war, its statements, its espionage within North
America, its explosion of an atomic bomb, and its generally hostile stance
were extremely worrisome. By the mid 1950's, the United States and
Canada both were concerned that Soviet Union's new jet powered,
long-range bombers could reach North America with nuclear weapons. This
was a subject of study and discussion at meetings between officials of the
two countries. The two countries also discussed the Soviet threat to North
America and the vulnerabilities of North America at PJBD meetings.
North American Air Defense Command
In the years that followed, these discussions led the United States and
Canada to take actions to bolster our defenses against foreign attack by air.
In 1958, Canada and the United States created a binational command, the
North American, later aerospace, the North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD), to defend against bombers that might attack North America. 5
4 Franklin

D. Roosevelt, D-Day Prayer, (June 6, 1944), available at
www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odddayp.html
5 North American Air Defense Command, T.I.A.S. No. 4031, 9 U.S.T. 538, U.S.
Treaty, signed and entered into force on May 12, 1958, Can.-U.S., available at 1958 WL
55923.
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The two countries also collaborated in developing capabilities to provide
as early warning as possible of any such bombers invading North American
airspace. The permanent and pine tree ground control intercept radar
systems and the distant early warning line were early defense systems jointly
established and operated to provide NORAD with early warning of possible
attack by air. These defense systems have contributed to protect North
America from attack by bombers coming from afar.
NORAD is a binational command. This is a truly extraordinary defense
arrangement, unlike any other defense arrangement either country has. Both
U.S. and Canadian military personnel staff NORAD. The staff is totally
binational, meaning that U.S. and Canadian personnel work together in one
chain of command with authority determined strictly by rank, regardless of
whether the uniform is American or Canadian. Command headquarters are
in Colorado Springs, Colorado. By agreement, the Commander and Deputy
Commander must not be from the same country. The current Commander of
NORAD is an American, General Ed Eberhardt; and the Deputy Commander
is a Canadian, Lieutenant General Ken Pennie. NORAD's top priority is to
provide aerospace warning and control of North American airspace.
NORAD has performed this mission by tracking objects and by scrambling
U.S. and Canadian fighter aircraft the militaries of the two countries make
available to NORAD.
Prior to September 11, 2001, NORAD focused on threats from the air
originating outside North America. NORAD tracked more than two and a
half million non-North American originating flights per year. On September
1h, at a time when a Canadian Major General was in charge of the NORAD
Command Center, deep within Cheyenne Mountain's 1,800 feet of granite,
an attack originated from within North America. s a result of what
happened that day, NORAD's mission was expanded to look for threats from
the air originating from inside North America, as well as from outside the
continent. This mission has entailed very close collaboration with U.S. and
Canadian civilian agencies to detect, identify, and classify all aircraft within
North American airspace.
Since the September 1 1 th attacks, NORAD has defended North American
airspace through Operation Noble Eagle, in which armed fighters fly
irregular combat air patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft.
NORAD has flown more than 29,000 combat air patrol sorties and there have
been more than 1,000 intercepts in this period. As you can see, NORAD now
provides a very robust defense against threats from the air in this new
environment where threats may originate either at home or abroad.
It is important to remember that although NORAD was created to defend
Americans and Canadians in their homeland from attack by airplanes
launched from abroad, it was not tasked with defending us from attack by
ballistic missiles. This is true even though NORAD's mission now includes
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tracking missile launches and objects in space. Indeed, the 1968
Canada-United States agreement renewing NORAD explicitly stated that
Canada's signing the renewal was not to be taken as Canada's agreement to
participate in any such systems the United States might research or develop
to defend against offensive ballistic missiles. 6 Of course, the United States in
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union agreed to severe
restrictions on research, development, and deployment of such defenses;'
restrictions that continued until U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty effective in
June of 2002.8
It is also important to note that over the years, Canada and the United
States have had no NORAD type relationship respecting maritime and land
defense. It was only last year that the two governments signed an agreement
to establish a group within NORAD to develop plans for coordinating
maritime and land defense of North America, as well as for coordinating
military support of civilian agencies. I hope that this planning group will
provide a model for a NORAD of the 21 St Century.
CHANGES IN U.S. MILITARY
Not long after the euphoria of our World War II victory subsided, the U.S.
realized that Soviet ambitions and hostility combined with the limited
capabilities of friends and allies in the free world meant that the United
States would have to maintain a robust military with a worldwide presence.
We took steps to enable us to do this. We separated our Air Force from our
Army, and gave the new United States Air Force its own mission. We
created a Department of Defense to house the Navy, Army, Air Force, and
Marines and to coordinate the operations of the four services, as well as to
serve the President as principal advisor on defense matters. We adopted a
policy of forward deployment; keeping a large number of forces and amounts
of equipment stationed overseas in locations close to the sources of threats to
the United States and to our friends and allies. We invested in technology
and developed and deployed the very best and most effective aircraft, ships,
submarines, tanks, and surveillance equipment. We did this and continue to
do this at enormous cost.
6 North American Air Defense Command Agreement extending the agreement of May 12,
1958, Can.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 6467, 19 U.S.T. 4719, U.S. Treaty, Mar 30, 1968, available at
1968 WL 89462.
7 Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, 23 U.S.T.
3435, U.S.
Treaty, Oct 03, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., availableat 1972 WL 122509.
8 Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., US. Will Withdraw From 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty,
Press Release, U.S DEPT. OF STATE, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/pol/arms/stories/0 1121301 .htm
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In 1947, the United States Military Services were organized into regional
combatant commands, each of which had a Commander in Chief or CINC, as
he used to be called. The U.S. Military Services today are organized into
regional combatant commands, as well as functional commands. The
commanders, formerly CINCS, are all four Star Generals. Since 1986, the
United States commands have been joint, more supportive of one another
and, therefore, more effective collectively.
Each of the regional combatant Commanders has responsibility for all war
fighting and other military activity within his region subject to approval of
his overall plan and request for forces and equipment from Washington.
Until last year, the regions for which the U.S. assigned combatant
Commanders were all offshore covering most of the planet outside North
America. Last year, these commands were redefined.
North American Northern Command
For the first time, a combatant command was established for North
America. While the establishment of a North American combatant command
had been under discussion for some years, the September 1 1 th attacks of our
homeland accelerated that discussion. That command known as Northern
Command or NORTHCOM, has responsibility for all military activities
necessary to deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the United States homeland
from the air, land, and sea. The geographic area for which NORTHCOM is
responsible includes the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and the
500 miles of water off the shores of the continent.
General Ed Eberhardt, the Commander of NORAD, has been dual added
to command NORTHCOM, as well. NORTHCOM is just like each of the
other combatant commands the United States maintains. It has responsibility
for all military activities necessary to deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the
United States from the air, land, and sea within its geographic area.
NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces. When mission
requirements dictate, NORTHCOM requests forces from the Secretary of
Defense. If the request is approved, forces are assigned to NORTHCOM by
the United States Joint Forces Command, one of the functional commands
into which the U.S. military is divided.
A principal part of the NORTHCOM mission is to provide military
assistance to U.S. civilian agencies when directed to do so by the President or
the Secretary of Defense. Another is to develop plans for land and maritime
defense of the continental United States. NORTHCOM also provides
command and control of U.S. consequence management forces that would
respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield
explosive events. Finally, it is tasked with supporting Federal, State, and
local counter drug law enforcement agencies.
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CANADIAN FORCES
Implicit in what I have already said is that Canada, too, recognized the
post World War II threat posed to our homeland by the Soviet Union's
possession of nuclear weapons and long range bombers. It also recognized
the Soviet threat internationally, particularly to Europe. Recognition of the
former, led Canada to join the United States in NORAD. Recognition of the
latter, as well as the desire to be of influence globally, led Canada to become
a charter member of NATO in 1949. 9
Canada maintained a modest, not robust, military capability during the
cold war years. After the end of the cold war, each of the western countries
sought a peace dividend. The premise seems to have been that the threats to
the homeland had disappeared. The premise prevailed even as threats to
peace elsewhere required military intervention time and again. Manpower
and military expenditures were reduced sharply in the United States and in
Canada, even as the remaining military personnel and equipment were asked
to do more. While the United States military started off the 1990's with a
robust base and continued to invest some significant degree in research,
development, repair, replacement, and training, Canadian forces started off
the 1990's from a weaker base. Canada did not make significant investments
in its future, even as it asked more of the Canadian forces. In my view, the
need to address a perilous threat to North America exists today as much as it
existed at the time the PJBD was created in 1940. Although, the nature of the
threat is different today than it was then.
Terrorists operate on U.S. and Canadian soil. Terrorists and rogue states
can do battle on our soil from afar and within. Missiles and weapons of mass
destruction are or soon will be part of their arsenals. There is a need to
strengthen our military ability to deter, prevent and defeat those with a
demonstrated will and ability to make our homeland a battleground.
1994 White Paper on Defense
While the United States since September 1 1 th has taken significant steps
to do this, Canada has not. Nine years ago, Canada adopted a 1994 Defense
White Paper.' 0 This official statement of defense and foreign policy was to
serve as the guide for defense policy and expenditures, and is still Canada's
official policy. It states "Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its
part to defend freedom and democracy," and concludes that, "The
9 North Atlantic Treaty; T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 63 Stat 2241, U.S. Treaty, Aug 24, 1949,
available at 1949 WL 37618.
10 1994 White Paper on Defence, CANADIAN

DEPT. OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (1994),

available at www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/whitee.htm
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maintenance of multipurpose combat capable forces is in the national
interest." Essentially, the 1994 White Paper promised that Canada would
equip its armed forces to participate on the world stage as a middle level
power. However, it also said that the threat environment allowed and other
Canadian priorities required substantial reductions in the size of Canadian
forces and expenditures.
After the 1994 Defense White Paper, Canada reduced the size of its
forces, as the White Paper promised it would, and very sharply cut its
defense expenditures."l Although, over the last three years it has restored a
portion of the cuts. As a consequence of its reductions, recruitment fell
sharply. The average age of Canadian forces is 10 years greater than that of
the U.S. forces. Also, Canada allowed much of its Army and Air Force
equipment to fall into a state of disrepair. Additionally, Canada has not
acquired new equipment that in many cases is necessary to operate in tandem
technologically with the U.S. Nor has Canada acquired the air or sea lift
capability necessary to take its forces where they sometimes are ordered to
operate in Canada's vital interest. In short, Canada's government has
undermined its continued policy of maintaining "a multipurpose combat
capable force." The Canadian forces have a shortage of personnel
sufficiently trained to operate and maintain some of their equipment and
insufficient funds to remedy this. Moreover, the Canadian forces are
overextended.
Last November, the Canadian Senate Committee on National Security
reported that the Canadian forces are in a severe state of disrepair and need
"a respite" from its manifold overseas responsibilities giving it time to
recruit, time to train, time to rethink its optimal role in the modem theater of
warfare. It concluded that the current defense budget was insufficient to
sustain the Canadian forces. Canada's defense budget in the fiscal year that
ended March 31 st, was $12.4 billion dollars, including the supplement. As a
percentage of gross national product, Canada spends less on defense than any
NATO members, except Luxembourg and Iceland. Remember, Iceland does
not have a military. Canada, in February, announced its 2003 budget that
provides an increase of 800 million Canadian dollars per year for defense.
The government says that this increase, which begins this month, will
address Canada's military sustainability gap and stabilize the Canadian
forces. But this amount, although a step in the right direction, is far less than
1

See, e.g., Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, CANADIAN PARLIAMENT,

STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE, Feb. 2002, available at

www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep05febO2-e.htm;

Also see,

Defense of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, CANADIAN PARLIAMENT, STANDING
SENATE COMMITrEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE, Sept. 2002, available at

www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep08sepO2-e.htm
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the parliamentary committees and outside experts estimate is necessary to
achieve these goals.
Notwithstanding insufficient financial support, Canadian forces have
made important contributions to North American defense. Canada's Navy is
uniquely interoperable with the U.S. Navy. No other Navy can operate as
seamlessly with the U.S. In that respect, it is exemplary. Canadian ships and
personnel play a leading role in a U.S. led task force of 20 ships in the
Persian Gulf right now. The Princess Patricia's Light Infantry Battle Group
contributed significantly to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as
did Canadian naval forces and air support forces. Moreover, Canada's
military has played a special role in the world giving necessary to support the
peacekeeping operations in Africa, in the Middle East, and in Bosnia.
Canada also recently announced it would play a substantial role in the
international security assistance force in Afghanistan by supplying two
consecutive tours of 1,500 troops.
But a shortage of government financial support has increasingly limited
the ability of Canadian forces to share the defense and security burden. For
example, the Princess Patricia's Battle Group had to be withdrawn from
Afghanistan after only six months. Similarly, a substantial part of the
Canadian naval forces that sailed with the U.S. ships in Operation Enduring
Freedom had to be withdrawn before the mission was complete. Canada had
appropriated insufficient resources to replace the forces and the ships at the
conclusion of their tour. Another illustration of resource insufficiency
limiting Canadian forces is that Canada does not have the lift to transport the
1,500 Canadian forces soon to join the international security assistance force
in Afghanistan, to sustain them while they are there, or even to bring them
home. It will need the help of others to do that. Canada's Resource Star
Forces are impeded in their ability to operate within North America, as well.
For example, in November, Canada's Commander of Atlantic Naval Forces
said that because of a lack of resources, he would have to cut back
substantially on his fleet's fishery patrols, cancel a joint forces exercise,
withdraw from a multinational exercise, and cancel all mechanical mine
sweeping, domestic readiness, and advanced combat readiness.
As I mentioned earlier, a three star Canadian General is the Deputy
Commander of NORAD. He is leading the NORAD planning group that will
be figuring out how to best achieve binational land, maritime, and civil
support cooperation between the United States and Canada. But the Canadian
force's capacity to contribute to implementing and hope for coordinated
maritime and land defense in support of civilian agencies, as well as their
capacity to contribute to NORAD is casting doubt because of the absence of
support from the government. For example, in the event of a chemical,
biological, or nuclear high yield attack on North America that overwhelms
U.S. national and state resources Canada's national capabilities for
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consequence management and civil support are small and provincial
capabilities are virtually nonexistent.
Canadian government leaders should do more to address modem threats
to our homeland and to prevent North America from becoming a
battleground again. Canada needs to make policy changes, as well as to
increase the level of financial support for Canadian forces. I can give you
several examples. First, Canada's current policy would prohibit it from
establishing or participating in a missile defense system providing a space
capability to destroy a missile heading from North Korea to Vancouver or
Seattle. Second, Canada today is without an information operations policy
that would allow it to contribute to allied computer attack missions. Third,
although significant Canadian forces were busy in the Persian Gulf operating
in the war on terrorism and quietly giving indirect support to the U.S. led
coalition, Canadian government leaders were disappointingly busy at home
criticizing the U.S. for its leadership in Iraq. Numerous organized groups of
Canadian citizens have decried the extent to which the government has
starved Canadian forces of financial support. Parliament's Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade issued a detailed report that Minister
Graham referred to the other day. 12 This report urged the government to dramatically increase defense expenditures, but the government has not been
responsive to this recommendation.
I note that the threats to North America are different today than they were
in 1940, but the fact that the threats to North American security then and now
are different obscures a more important point. The point relevant to the
subject of our meeting this afternoon, the defense of North America, is that
the Prime Minister in 1940 viewed the threat to North American security as
great. He saw that North America likely would shortly become a
battleground in which forces from abroad would imperil the safety and the
security of Americans and Canadians. The case seems to be very different
today. The United States, at least on September 1 1 th, and earlier than that for
some of us, perceived the threat of attack on North America to be growing at
an alarming rate. North America was, in fact, made a battleground on 9-11.
In the post 9-11 world, many of us in the United States believe that our
families, our homes, and our friends risk attack by an implacable, stealthy
enemy every day. The source of this threat in my eyes, and in the eyes of
many of my fellow Americans, are terrorists groups unconstrained by moral
principal and often energized by purported religious beliefs, state sponsors of
terrorism that have no moral constraints on their own conduct, and the
12 For an Extra 130 Bucks... Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis - A View
From The Bottom Up, CANADIAN PARLIAMENT, STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENCE, Nov. 2002, available at www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/
senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep02novO2-e.htm
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increasing availability to weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems
from despicable governments like Saddam Hussein's. Canada does not speak
or act as if it perceives these developments to be threats imperiling the safety
of Canadian citizens, their families and friends.
The 1994 Defense White Paper, which promised defense reductions
despite also promising that Canada would have a robust military, was
premised on the assumption that North America was a safe haven.13 The
paper noted, "the dramatically reduced threat of global war." It anticipated a
future where only "pockets of chaos and instability would threaten
international peace and security," and flatly asserted "today's conflicts are far
from our shores." There is little indication from defense expenditures or
Canadian defense policy that Canadian government has changed this view.
Indeed, Canada's Transport Minister in February said that there is "no
14
discernible information that there is a pending security threat in Canada;"
an expression echoing those previously and since made by other ministers.
With this denial of the new threat environment, Canadian government leaders
see no need to take additional steps to provide Canadian forces with greater
resources and other support for the defense of Canadian citizens much less
for the defense of North America. I hope it will not take a calamity to
persuade the government that Canadians also confront a greater threat today.
I hope the government of Canada comes to agree that the threat of vicious
terrorists and evil leaders of rogue states with weapons of mass destruction
warrants prescribing a serious major role for Canadian forces in overcoming
the threat and warrants appropriating the resources Canadian forces will need
to play such a robust role.
When the government of Canada sufficiently recognizes the perilous
threat to North America that exists today, I am confident that it will enable its
forces to play a more robust role in the defense of North America. The
details of what the government prescribes that role to be, whether the role is
"multipurpose combat capable forces" with global reach, or more limited
niche roles coordinated with U.S. forces is less important than that the
Canadian forces be sufficiently supported in playing the robust role assigned
by the government. In the meanwhile, I am confident that the United States
intends to use all of its economic, political, and military power to deter,
prevent, and if necessary defeat those who would make our homeland a
battleground in the 21st Century. The battleground must not be in North
America. We intend to take the battle to those who have made it so and we
13 1994 White Paper on Defense, supra note 10.
14 Hon. David Collenette, Testimony before Parliament on the issue of Terrorism,
d

th
37

Parliament, 2
Session, Ed. Hansard, No. 59 (Feb. 13, 2003), available at
www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/059_2003-02-13/hanO59_1430-E.htm
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appreciate the help Canada has provided, and hopefully will provide. Thank
you for your attention.

